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Michael Laakasuo* and Jukka Sundvall
Cognitive Science Unit, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
Utilitarian versus deontological inclinations have been studied extensively in the field
of moral psychology. However, the field has been lacking a thorough psychometric
evaluation of the most commonly used measures. In this paper, we examine the
factorial structure of an often used set of 12 moral dilemmas purportedly measuring
utilitarian/deontological moral inclinations. We ran three different studies (and a pilot) to
investigate the issue. In Study 1, we used standard Exploratory Factor Analysis and
Schmid-Leimann (g factor) analysis; results of which informed the a priori single-factor
model for our second study. Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis in Study 2 were
replicated in Study 3. Finally, we ran a weak invariance analysis between the models of
Study 2 and 3, concluding that there is no significant difference between factor loading in
these studies. We find reason to support a single-factor model of utilitarian/deontological
inclinations. In addition, certain dilemmas have consistent error covariance, suggesting
that this should be taken into consideration in future studies. In conclusion, three
studies, pilot and an invariance analysis, systematically suggest the following. (1) No
item needs to be dropped from the scale. (2) There is a unidimensional structure for
utilitarian/deontological preferences behind the most often used dilemmas in moral
psychology, suggesting a single latent cognitive mechanism. (3) The most common
set of dilemmas in moral psychology can be successfully used as a unidimensional
measure of utilitarian/deontological moral inclinations, but would benefit from using
weighted averages over simple averages. (4) Consideration should be given to dilemmas
describing infants.
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INTRODUCTION
Utilitarianism is an ethical philosophy stating that aggregate welfare or “good” should be
maximized and that suffering or “bad” should be minimized. It is usually contrasted with
deontological philosophy, which states that there are inviolable moral rules that do not change
depending on the situation (Greene, 2007b). From a utilitarian perspective, murder can be justified
if its benefits outweigh the costs, for instance, if a murder of a dangerous criminal saves lives. From
a deontological perspective, an act is simply right or wrong despite its consequences. Deontologists
argue that if a moral rule can be violated in one situation, it can be violated in any situation, and
therefore stops being a moral rule. For example, “do not kill” is a classic absolute deontological
rule, and thus murder is always wrong from a deontological perspective even if it saves lives. For a
utilitarian, the ends justify the means whereas for a deontologist they do not.
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In recent years, these two moral preferences have been studied
in the field of moral psychology by using vignettes, stories,
and dilemmas (e.g., Bartels and Pizarro, 2011; Djeriouat and
Trémolière, 2014; Lee and Gino, 2015; see Christensen and
Gomila, 2012 for a review). The type of stimulus material
most often used are sets of dilemmas that pit utilitarian and
deontological inclinations against each other in an emotionally
engaging way. These dilemmas often describe a situation where
the moral agent (or the participant) has the option to kill an
innocent person with her/his own actions, in order to save the
lives of several others. Such dilemmas, with a clear utilitarian
motivation to harm, have been called high-conflict dilemmas
because they require an emotionally taxing personal engagement.
That is to say, they create a conflict between utilitarian and
deontological inclinations by juxtaposing them on the same
continuum (e.g., Greene et al., 2008; Lee and Gino, 2015).
In contrast, dilemmas where the harm is impersonal, indirect
(caused by proxy), or has no utilitarian motivation, have been
called low-conflict as they do not require the same type of
personal engagement.
Nonetheless, reactions to high-conflict dilemmas are
theoretically more interesting, as they are much more varied than
reactions to low-conflict dilemmas (Greene, 2007b), and can be
used to measure the strengths of the two moral inclinations or
poles (Cushman and Greene, 2012). Indeed, the most commonly
used set of moral dilemmas are high-conflict moral dilemmas.
Furthermore, the high-conflict moral dilemmas are arguably
indicating that there could be a unitary cognitive resource (“g
factor”) latent behind both types of moral-cognitive preferences.
A classic example of a high-conflict dilemma is the footbridge
dilemma, where a runaway trolley is about to run over and kill
five people. The participant has the option to push an innocent
bystander down from a footbridge in front of the trolley, killing
the bystander, but saving five other people from certain death.
The participant is commonly asked if pushing the bystander to
their death is acceptable; accepting the “sacrifice” is considered
a utilitarian response. If the participant concludes that this
action is not permissible, their judgment is considered to be
deontological. A single scale can be used to describe the level
of utilitarianism versus deontology in these responses where, as
in the case of the runaway trolley, the preferences are mutually
exclusive.
Utilitarian preferences have been positively linked to all
three Dark Triad measures (Psychopathy, Narcissism and
Machiavellianism; Bartels and Pizarro, 2011) and negatively
with Honesty–Humility and harm/care ethics (Djeriouat and
Trémolière, 2014). Neuroscientific research has also found that
people with specific prefrontal cortex lesions prefer the utilitarian
options in these dilemmas (Koenigs et al., 2007); especially if
the limbic areas are unable to provide “emotional” information
for the “rational” prefrontal areas. In agreement with the above,
people with greater working memory capacity have been found
to be more utilitarian (Moore et al., 2008). In general, it has
been claimed that deontological responses to the aforementioned
dilemmas are an instinctive, emotionally based “gut reaction,”
and that utilitarian responses take more thought, being the
more rational or non-biased decision (e.g., Greene, 2007a).
However, Bauman et al. (2014) have raised concerns over the
external validity of moral dilemmas as a tool for measuring
moral judgments. Bauman et al. (2014) state that certain moral
dilemmas are more fit for philosophical discussion than actual
measurement, as the dilemmas do not resemble everyday life in a
meaningful way. On the other hand, Cushman and Greene (2012)
have argued that the clear–cut – and thus somewhat unrealistic –
nature of moral dilemmas is exactly the reason that sheds more
light on the underlying structure behind moral thought. For a
clear measurement of utilitarian versus deontological tendencies,
it may be that highly hypothetical scenarios are needed to get
clear signals regarding the structure of our moral cognition.
Notwithstanding, up to date, there has been no standard way
to pose the dilemmas or to measure utilitarian or deontological
preferences. Preferences have been measured using dichotomous
measures (most common) or Likert scales (See Christensen
and Gomila, 2012 for review). Also, there is not a single
standard set of dilemmas yet; at least three different sets of
dilemmas have been used in previous studies (e.g., Greene
et al., 2008; Bartels and Pizarro, 2011 and Lee and Gino, 2015),
while these sets are partially overlapping. However, as far as
we are aware, there has not been an extensive psychometric
assessment on validity of the scales as psychometric instruments
so far. Given the aforementioned associations between moral
inclinations, emotion, memory, personality, and brain lesions, it
becomes increasingly important to have validated instruments
for measurement. Though the dilemmas share a common
form, they describe a variety of different situations and thus
have qualitative differences. It is possible that some items
are better at measuring the moral inclinations than others.
Furthermore, some of them may form separate sub-factors
relevant for moral thought. In the following three studies, we
used a set of 12 high-conflict dilemmas developed by Greene
et al. (2008) to measure moral inclinations and examine the
factorial structure of responses to these dilemmas. We chose
this set as it has been used in several other studies and
utilizes the more interesting dilemma type. We started with
the standard assumption made in the literature, that these
dilemmas are part of a single-factor measurement model; i.e.,
they measure utilitarian versus deontological inclinations in a
uniform way. Different alternatives of this assumption are further
explored.
PILOT STUDY/INSTRUMENT
CALIBRATION
We collected a small sample to test if our initial assumption
regarding the unidimensional structure behind the dilemmas
would be supported. We further aimed to make sure that our
analyses would have an empirical foundation.
Ethical Statement
All local laws regarding ethics for social science research were
followed in full. All participation was fully voluntary and
participants were informed about their right to opt out at any
point without penalties. All materials and a study protocol were
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reviewed and approved by the University of Helsinki Ethical
Review Board in Humanities and Social and Behavioral sciences.
Methods
Participants and Procedure
Fifty-seven Finnish people were recruited to an anonymous
Internet study on Facebook. No identifying information, not even
gender, was collected. After providing their informed consent,
participants read the instructions and responded to the 12 moral
dilemmas using a 7 point Likert scale (Greene et al., 2008).
Materials
Moral preference measure
We used 12 high-conflict moral dilemmas adopted from Greene
et al. (2008). The dilemmas are presented in Supplementary
Material. In each of the dilemmas, the participant was instructed
to assume the role of the moral agent in the scenario. The moral
dilemmas deal with different topics from military emergencies
to trekking accidents and even situations where the agent has
to consider sacrificing their own child. Each of the dilemmas
described a morally ambiguous situation where the moral agent
has to judge how acceptable it is to kill or injure one person
in order to save multiple others (or to prevent a person from
suffering before inevitable death). The utilitarian option in each
dilemma has the moral agent carry the harm out with their own
hands – e.g., pushing a person off a footbridge in front of a
trolley.
All questions were framed in the following manner:
“How acceptable is it for you to do X [e.g., ‘push the
bystander off the footbdrige’]?” All questions were anchored
from 1: ‘not at all acceptable’ to 7: ‘totally acceptable.’
By conventional standards the sacrificial dilemmas had a
good inter-item reliability (Cronbach’s α = 0.92). Since
Cronbach’s α is known to have psychometric problems (e.g.,
Zinbarg et al., 2005; Dunn et al., 2014), we also calculated
Tarkkonen’s ρ for the items and their internal reliability
(ρ = 0.87), which indicated acceptable internal consistency as
well.
Results of Pilot Study
Theoretically, we assumed that there would only be one factor
for the dilemmas which was also suggested by Tarkkonen’s ρ. We
ran a parallel analysis to confirm this. Based on the Eigenvalue
criterion, the recommendation was one factor and based on
Optimal Coordinates, Acceleration Factor and Parallel analysis
the recommendation was also a single-factor solution. We also
ran a Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimated exploratory factor
analysis with VARIMAX rotation on our pilot data. According
to the analysis, all items loaded on a single factor (all loadings
>0.55) with an eigenvalue of 6.6, while the next possible extracted
factor had an eigenvalue of 0.85. We concluded that the small
sample pilot data suggests that it is worth pursuing a single-
factor solution for the factorial structure of the 12 most common
dilemmas in the field of Moral Psychology. For an example of
a graphical presentation for Parallel Analysis see the results of
Study 1.
STUDY 1
Since our pilot study was an ad hoc online study, we decided
to collect a larger laboratory data in conjunction with other
experiments (reported elsewhere), assuming that laboratory
data would be less noisy and a more uniformly controlled
environment than what, we would have in online questionnaires.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants were recruited through the social media and from
public libraries in the city center of Helsinki. One hundred
and fifty-six (N = 156; 65 male; Mage = 26.83; SDage = 8.81;
range = 18 – 62) people participated in laboratory experiments,
where they filled in the moral dilemmas in conjunction with
other tasks unrelated to the aims of this study (i.e., evaluating
emotions of faces and other emotional intelligence tasks).
All dilemmas were presented in a fully randomized order.
Participants answered the dilemmas in their native language and
were compensated an average of 2.5€ for their time.
Materials
Moral preference measure
We used the same materials as in the Pilot Study above. For a full
description of the materials, see Pilot Study and Supplementary
Material. By conventional standards, the high-conflict dilemmas
had a good inter-item reliability (Cronbach’s α = 0.89). We also
calculated Tarkkonen’s ρ (ρ = 0.82), which indicated acceptable
internal consistency as well.
Results
Theoretically, we assumed that there would only be one factor, as
also suggested by Tarkkonen’s ρ. Additionally, we ran a parallel
analysis to confirm this result. Based on Eigenvalue criterion,
the recommendation was two factors and based on Optimal
Coordinates, Acceleration Factor and Parallel analysis, one factor
(See Figure 1).
FIGURE 1 | Parallel analysis results for number of factors for the data
presented in Study 1.
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Next, we ran a ML estimated exploratory factor analysis for
a single-factor solution. All items loaded on the factor with
decent values (0.45 – 0.74). We also ran the two- and three-factor
analyses with no rotation, varimax and promax rotations (for full
factor loadings, see Tables 1 and 2).
The results of the unrotated two- and three-factor solutions
indicate that there would only be one factor on which all the items
load with decent values (from 0.45 to 0.77), whereas all the other
loadings on the other factors would be relatively weak (<|0.42|).
Varimax and promax rotations suggest that the second factor
would consist of four items: Crying Baby, Footbridge, Sacrifice,
and Sophie’s Choice. Three out of these four items deal with
situations where the participant has to think about sacrificing
children (own or not). However, since the footbridge dilemma
has nothing to do with children, there is no theoretical reason to
separate these four items from the other eight.
The Varimax-rotated three-dimensional solution was the
most ambiguous theoretically. This solution suggests that the
Euthanasia, Life Boat, Safari and Submarine dilemmas would
form one factor, and the four dilemmas that were extracted in
the previous solution (Crying Baby, Footbridge, Sacrifice, and
Sophie’s Choice) would consist of one factor, with all the rest
(Lawrence of Arabia, Terrorist’s Son, Vaccine, and Vitamins)
forming the third factor. We could not find any substantially
meaningful interpretation for this solution, since it also had two
relatively strong cross loadings. More specifically, the Footbridge
dilemma was as much associated with child sacrifice dilemmas
as with the factor consisting of Lawrence of Arabia, Terrorist’s
Son, Vaccine, and Vitamins; see also loadings for the Safari
dilemma.
The Promax-rotated three-factor solution was more
meaningful, since it suggested that the three dilemmas involving
child sacrifice (Crying Baby, Sacrifice, and Sophie’s Choice)
formed a single factor, and the two dilemmas embedded in
military context (Euthanasia and Submarine) would form
another factor, with all the other dilemmas forming a third
factor.
Finally, we ran a Schmid-Leiman factor analysis with promax
rotation assuming that there would be a general factor behind the
suggested two- and three-factor models to investigate; if any of
the items have a stronger loading on the sub-factors rather than
on the general Utilitarianism factor. In our analysis, we found
that for both the two- and three-factor solutions, the g factor had
the largest Eigenvalue (4.15 and 4.08, respectively). Only Factor 1
in the two-factor solution had an Eigenvalue slightly bigger than
1, indicating a marginal possibility for an independent factor.
However, since all the items in this factor have stronger loadings
on the g factor, there is no reason to separate factors from one
another. All the other factors had Eigenvalues smaller than 1,
indicating that these sub-factors contain less information than
the original items, and thus support the single-factor solution
(see Table 3). Furthermore, none of the items loaded more on
the sub-factors than on the general factor.
Discussion of Results for Study 1
The results of Study 1 provide moderate support for a single-
factor solution for the 12 high-conflict dilemmas. Especially the
parallel analysis, together with the unrotated two- and three-
factor solutions and the Schmid-Leiman factor analysis seem to
support the single-factor solution. The results also seem to imply
that no items should be dropped or left out of the measuring
model. There is a small possibility that emotional intelligence
tasks, could prime participants to give more deontological
responses for the dilemmas. However, since exploratory factor
analytic techniques commonly ignore the intercepts of the items,
this issue is not likely to cause considerable bias in the
analysis. Furthermore, since all the items were presented to the
participants in randomized order, the possible priming effects are
diffused equally over all of the items.
TABLE 1 | Solutions of exploratory unidimensional and two-dimensional factor analyses.
Two-dimensional solutions
Unidimensional solution Unrotated Varimax Promax
Item Loading error F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 η2
Crying baby 0.66 0.56 0.72 −0.37 0.28 0.76 0.82 0.65
Euthanasia 0.65 0.58 0.63 0.53 0.35 0.51 0.16 0.40
Foot bridge 0.50 0.75 0.51 0.31 0.42 0.37 0.27
Lawrence of Arabia 0.69 0.53 0.68 0.35 0.74 0.20 0.86 0.58
Terrorist’s son 0.51 0.74 0.50 0.47 0.23 0.50 0.27
Life boat 0.75 0.43 0.73 0.64 0.38 0.65 0.55
Safari 0.72 0.48 0.71 0.61 0.40 0.59 0.52
Sacrifice 0.72 0.48 0.78 −0.35 0.35 0.78 0.82 0.74
Sophie’s choice 0.48 0.77 0.52 −0.40 0.65 0.77 0.43
Submarine 0.79 0.38 0.77 0.22 0.71 0.36 0.75 0.64
Vaccine 0.69 0.52 0.68 0.35 0.74 0.20 0.86 0.59
Vitamins 0.46 0.78 0.45 0.37 0.27 0.34 0.21
Loadings <|0.20| not printed, loadings >|0.45| have been highlighted.
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TABLE 2 | Solutions of exploratory three-dimensional factor analyses.
Three-dimensional solutions
Unrotated Varimax Promax
Item F1 F2 F3 F1 F2 F3 F1 F2 F3 η2
Crying baby 0.71 −0.38 0.33 0.72 0.75 0.65
Euthanasia 0.66 −0.39 0.73 0.27 0.76 0.60
Foot bridge 0.51 0.29 0.42 0.42 0.35 0.43 0.36
Lawrence of Arabia 0.68 0.31 0.49 0.58 0.31 0.64 0.59
Terrorist’s son 0.50 0.42 0.22 0.61 0.72 0.44
Life boat 0.75 −0.26 0.74 0.29 0.21 0.71 0.08 0.67
Safari 0.71 0.45 0.36 0.44 0.26 0.16 0.42 0.52
Sacrifice 0.77 −0.39 0.29 0.77 0.28 0.77 0.75
Sophie’s choice 0.51 −0.40 0.22 0.62 0.01 0.70 0.43
Submarine 0.78 0.22 0.70 0.28 0.34 0.61 0.27 0.68
Vaccine 0.68 0.31 0.20 0.48 0.59 0.30 0.65 0.60
Vitamins 0.46 0.28 0.27 0.44 0.49 0.29
Loadings smaller than |0.2| are not printed, Loadings ≥0.45 are highlighted.
TABLE 3 | Schmid-Leiman factor analysis for two and three factors with promax rotation.
Analysis
Two-factor solution Three-factor solution
Item g F1 F2 η2 g F1 F2 F3 η2
Crying baby 0.67 0.45 0.65 0.63 0.49 0.65
Euthanasia 0.56 0.28 0.40 0.56 0.53 0.60
Foot bridge 0.47 0.27 0.47 0.28 0.23 0.36
Lawrence of Arabia 0.59 0.47 0.58 0.61 0.22 0.41 0.59
Terrorist’s son 0.45 0.27 0.27 0.47 0.46 0.44
Life boat 0.65 0.35 0.55 0.65 0.49 0.67
Safari 0.64 0.32 0.52 0.64 0.27 0.52
Sacrifice 0.73 0.45 0.74 0.70 0.50 0.75
Sophie’s choice 0.49 0.42 0.43 0.46 0.46 0.43
Submarine 0.68 0.41 0.64 0.68 0.42 0.68
Vaccine 0.60 0.47 0.59 0.61 0.20 0.42 0.60
Vitamins 0.41 0.21 0.42 0.31 0.29
Eigenvalues 4.15 1.05 0.66 4.08 0.85 0.86 0.80
Loadings smaller than 0.2 are not printed. Greatest loadings per item are highlighted.
Taken together, the results of the first study give moderate
support for the contention that there might be a unitary cognitive
mechanism associated with the way people respond to these
moral dilemmas. We also found that the three items dealing
with child sacrifice (see Crying Baby, Sacrifice, and Sophie’s
Choice in Supplementary Material), seemed to be more or less
systematically associated with one another. We took this into
account in our follow-up studies. Since an analysis based on
a single laboratory data set offers only limited support for any
conclusions, we collected another data to investigate if the results
would replicate in a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).
STUDY 2
The results of Study 1 imply partly that there is a unitary single-
factor structure behind the items measuring utilitarianism in
sacrificial moral dilemmas. We therefore decided to run a CFA
hypothesizing that all items would load on a single latent factor.
Our hypothesized model is presented in Figure 2 below. In this
model, we further included a priori assumptions that the errors
between the three items dealing with child sacrifice would be
correlated. We made this assumption based on our observations
from our first study where these three items were repeatedly
associated with one another but would not come out as a full
independent factor of their own either for technical reasons
(Eigenvalues<1) or for substantial reasons (being associated with
the Footbridge dilemma).
Method
Participants and Procedure
All participants were recruited from the e-mailing lists of student
unions in Finland. Three hundred and forty-six people (N = 346;
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FIGURE 2 | A priori model for confirmatory factor analysis for Study 2, based on the results of Study 1.
54 male; Mage= 25.23; SDage= 5.85; range= 18 – 65) successfully
completed a correlational study prepared with the commercial
questionnaire software Qualtrics. After giving their informed
consent, participants filled in some exploratory measures not
related to the present study (i.e., perception of time and
childhood stability), after which they progressed to the high-
conflict dilemmas. Participants had a chance to win one out of
five movie tickets in a raﬄe as compensation.
Materials
Moral preference measure
We used the same materials in Study 2 as we did previously.
For a full description of the materials see Pilot Study and
Supplementary Material. Cronbach’s α for the items in this
sample was 0.89 and Tarkkonen’s ρ = 0.83, both indicating
acceptable internal consistency.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Its
Evaluation Criteria
For our CFA, we used the statistical programming language
R and a peer-reviewed structural equation modeling library
called lavaan (Rosseel, 2012). Lavaan is a reliable Open Source
alternative for Mplus and provides the same model evaluation
criteria. Here, we report the most common ones recommended
by Kline (2010) which are: (1) X2; (2) The comparative fit
index (CFI); (3) The root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA); and (4) Standardized root mean square residual
(SRMR). We also report TLI as recommended by Byrne (2012).
X2 is traditionally used in CFA as a fit index and it is expected
to be as close to zero as possible and thus not expected to be
significant (i.e., p-value should be >0.05); however, in practice
with sample sizes>200 it is almost always statistically significant.
Nonetheless X2 can still be helpful in estimating fits between
several models. CFI is an index that gets values from 0 to 1
measuring discrepancy between the hypothesized model and
the actual data. CFI is not influenced by the sample size, 0.90
is usually considered to be a passable value, however, values
above 0.95 are commonly expected in peer review. RMSEA is an
absolute measure of a model fit, which improves as the number
of variables in the model or the number of observations in the
sample go up. Cut-off points of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.08 have been
suggested, corresponding to excellent, good, and mediocre fits,
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FIGURE 3 | Results for Study 2.
respectively (MacCallum et al., 1996); confidence intervals should
be used to understand the size of sampling error (upper-bound
should preferable be <0.1). The SRMR indicates the difference
between observed and predicted values; zero indicating perfect
fit; values <0.08 are considered to indicate a good fit (Hu and
Bentler, 1999). TLI, or Tucker-Lewis Index is a similar measure
to CFI but it imposes heavier penalties for complex models; 0.95
is considered to be the cut-off point for indicating good fit (Hu
and Bentler, 1999).
Results
We ran a CFA on the hypothesized model presented in Figure 2
with a robust Maximum Likelihood (MLM) estimation. This
hypothesized initial model did have a satisfactory fit with the
hypothesized model (X2(51) = 123.38, CFI = 0.96, TLI = 0.95,
RMSEA = 0.06, 90% CI [0.05 – 0.08], SRMR = 0.04). We
then proceed to investigate potential model modifications. We
decided to add error covariance between the Life Boat and
Submarine dilemmas into the model, since both deal with an
emergency situation at the sea (Suggested MI: 27.67). This
increased the model fit statistically significantly (1X2 = 19.86,
p < 0.001; X2(50) = 100.90, CFI = 0.97, TLI = 0.96,
RMSEA = 0.05, 90% CI [0.04 – 0.07], SRMR = 0.036).
All the estimates of the model were statistically significant
(for standardized estimates/factor loadings see Figure 3
below).
Discussion of the Results for Study 2
The results of Study 2 imply that there is a unitary single-
factor structure behind the items measuring utilitarianism in
high-conflict moral dilemmas. Furthermore, the hypothesized
error covariances were all statistically significant. This indicates
that although the three items that deal with child sacrifice
do not cluster together strongly enough to warrant separating
them into their own factor, they are nonetheless associated.
This could be an indicator that the general machinery
responsible for utilitarian-deontological judgments might take
in situational cues which change the weights in the way
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these judgments are reached or made (e.g., Kurzban et al.,
2012).
Our further modification of the measurement model, adding
the covariance term between the Submarine and Life Boat
dilemmas, was also substantially and statistically warranted. The
factor loadings of the measurement model are moderately strong
and relatively similar to those found in out laboratory data (see
Figure 3). However, since this model was modified and error
covariance terms were added to the model, we wanted to replicate
the results of our CFA with another data set to rule out the
possibility of over fitting our model.
STUDY 3
The results of the two previous studies suggest that there is a
uniform general structure behind the sacrificial moral dilemmas
and that the three items dealing with child sacrifice are associated.
Furthermore, a shared error covariance term between two sea-
related dilemmas was added to the model in Study 2. We ran
a third study to confirm the model constructed in Study 2 in
order to rule out possible idiosyncrasies or overfitting that could
possibly account for the results of Study 2. Finally, we also tested
for the equality of the factor loadings between Studies 2 and 3.
Method
Participants and Design
The data was collected from The Netherlands (N = 174) and
from Finland (N = 343). All Dutch participants were recruited
through the social media. All Finnish participants were recruited
from the e-mailing lists of student unions in Finland. To sum
up, five hundred and seventeen people in total (N = 517; 180
male; Mage = 26.30; SDage = 8.42; range = 18 – 66) successfully
completed a study prepared with the commercial questionnaire
software Qualtrics. The data was collected in conjunction with
larger on-line experiment, results of which will be reported
elsewhere. After giving their informed consent, participants filled
in some exploratory measures (i.e., rating content of pictures and
other emotional sensitivity measures) not related to the present
study, after which they progressed to the sacrificial dilemmas.
All participants responded to all the questions in their native
language. Participants had a chance to win one out of three movie
tickets in a raﬄe as compensation.
Materials
Moral preference measure
We used the same materials as in the previous studies. For a full
Description of the materials see Pilot Study and Supplementary
Material. Cronbach’s α for the items in this sample was 0.88
and Tarkkonen’s ρ = 0.79, both indicating acceptable internal
consistency.
Results
Testing the A priori Model from Study 2
We ran a CFA on the final model of Study 2 (Figure 3), with
a robust Maximum Likelihood (MLM) estimation. This initial
model did have a satisfactory fit with the model (X2(50)= 135.99,
CFI = 0.96, TLI = 0.94, RMSEA = 0.06, 90% CI [0.05 – 0.07],
SRMR = 0.04), hence, we did not proceeded with further model
modification. These results indicate that the single-factor solution
that was found in the previous study was also valid in this data.
We then proceeded to test whether the factor loadings between
the two data sets were equal.
Testing for Configural and Weak Invariance between
Study 2 and Study 3
We combined the data sets from Study 2 and Study 3 and ran
a CFA for two groups to test the fit of our configural model.
Since the results indicated that the configural model fits the
data acceptably (X2(100) = 236.85, CFI = 0.96, TLI = 0.95,
RMSEA = 0.05, 90% CI [0.04 – 0.06], SRMR = 0.03), we
proceeded to test the equality of the factor loadings across the
two models (i.e., weak invariance). The results indicate that a
CFA model, where loadings are constrained equal across groups,
fits the data well (X2(111) = 261.21, CFI = 0.96, TLI = 0.95,
RMSEA = 0.05, 90% CI [0.04 – 0.06], SRMR = 0.04). Cheung
and Rensvold (2002) recommend using change in CFI for testing
invariance across groups. This is due to the fact that 1X2 is
effected by sample size whereas 1CFI is not (our combined
sample for Studies 2 and 3 is very large, N > 850). Changes
in CFI < 0.01, as observed here, are considered trivial. In
conclusion, there are no meaningful differences in factor loadings
between Studies 2 and 3. See full listing of estimations and factor
loadings in Table 4.
Discussion of Results for Study 3
The results of Study 3 support the one factor solution suggested
by Study 1 and Study 2. Furthermore, our results indicate
that the three dilemmas associated with child sacrifice should
be given consideration when using these items as a scale in
experimental studies. We also ran a cross-validation analysis
for the model found in Study 2, which essentially shows that
the factor loadings are stable across samples and replicable with
decent accuracy.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In three studies (and a pilot), we examined the factorial structure
of the 12 high-conflict moral dilemmas presented by Greene et al.
(2008), by asking participants to denote their level of acceptance
of a deontological violation on a Likert scale. The purpose was to
examine the factorial structure of these responses to see whether
all of the dilemmas truly measure the same thing. Across all three
studies, we found support for a unidimensional factorial solution
by using both (multiple) exploratory and confirmatory factor
analytic techniques, as well as by using an alternative reliability
criterion (Tarkkonen’s ρ) to Cronbach’s α. The results suggest
that there might be a uniform cognitive mechanism involved and
that none of the items should be dropped from the scale or the
measurement model.
We found that all of the three dilemmas dealing with child
sacrifice were associated with each other in all three of our studies,
but not strongly enough to form their own sub-factor (supporting
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TABLE 4 | Factor scores from standardized and non-standardized factor loadings of invariance testing from combined data sets of Studies 2 and 3.
Standardized loadings
Items Estimate S.E. Z-value p-value Data 2 Data 3
Crying baby 1.00 0.64 0.58
Euthanasia 1.12 0.05 18.81 <0.001 0.70 0.66
Foot bridge 0.78 0.06 15.17 <0.001 0.59 0.55
Lawrence of Arabia 1.08 0.06 15.99 <0.001 0.69 0.64
Terrorist’s son 0.92 0.06 14.94 <0.001 0.59 0.50
Life boat 1.17 0.06 17.19 <0.001 0.70 0.66
Safari 1.23 0.04 18.84 <0.001 0.75 0.72
Sacrifice 0.95 0.05 19.58 <0.001 0.64 0.54
Sophie’s choice 0.97 0.06 17.33 <0.001 0.61 0.59
Submarine 1.13 0.06 16.93 <0.001 0.74 0.74
Vaccine 1.16 0.06 17.41 <0.001 0.68 0.65
Vitamins 0.81 0.06 12.74 <0.001 0.48 0.46
Data 2 refers to the data set described in Study 2 and Data 3 refers to the data set described in Study 3.
the kin-selection moderation hypothesis suggested by Kurzban
et al., 2012). We also found that two of the dilemmas set in a
maritime context had a repeatedly associated residual covariance
(Studies 2 and 3). We ran a cross-validation/invariance analysis
for the factorial loadings of the items that were measuring
the latent factor of utilitarian moral preference, and showed
that the results can be reliably replicated (along with controls
for residual covariances). Future studies using these dilemmas
as dependent measures should take the error covariances into
consideration when building measurement scales. Also, serious
consideration should be given to the strategy of using a weighted
average of the dilemmas rather than a simple average, since
not all items load on the latent factor equally. We suggest
the unstandardized factor loadings from Table 4 as possible
candidates for weights.
At the time of writing, the field of moral psychology is
progressing rapidly. Although the new revolution in moral
psychology began from neuroscience, studies using these high-
conflict moral dilemmas, or their variations, as dependent
measures are being published in new journals and in new contexts
with an increasing pace. Furthermore, utilitarianism is now
being correlated with different individual trait measures and
used in increasingly varied contexts. Thus, a psychometrically
validated and tested instrument should be developed so that
the results coming from different papers and from different
fields can be reliably compared and assessed in relation to
one another. Given that some changes in moral judgment
have been linked with psychopathologies (e.g., Koenigs et al.,
2011), neural lesions (e.g., Greene, 2007b; Koenigs et al.,
2007), psychopharmacological agents (e.g., Perkins et al.,
2012; Terbeck et al., 2013), and personality dimensions
(e.g., Bartels and Pizarro, 2011), the research has become
influential enough to have real life implications and, possibly,
even policy recommendations. Therefore, it is not irrelevant
which instruments are used and how moral preferences
or judgments for utilitarian or deontological morality are
operationalized.
Measurement of utilitarian/deontological preferences with
a unidimensional instrument seems warranted, given certain
provisions. Given that there are several unvalidated instruments
in use, results from different past studies should be interpreted
with caution. Caution should also be exerted in interpreting
those past studies that have used the original set of high-
conflict dilemmas provided by Greene et al. (2008). Previously
theses items have either been dichotomous measures, or Likert
scales that have been summed or averaged together, and the
problems with the three child sacrificial dilemmas have not
extensively discussed (see Christensen and Gomila, 2012 for a
review). As far as we are aware, the psychometrical properties
of these dilemmas have not been properly tested with IRT
models (for dichotomous versions of the dilemmas) or with
extensive factor analytical techniques (for continuous Likert scale
versions), prior to our studies presented here. Our results provide
some evidence that not all dilemmas load on to the latent
factor equally, and therefore previous studies might have an
error component large enough to influence previous statistical
significance tests.
As with any study, this study suffers from the standard
limitations of laboratory and Internet-based questionnaire
studies. Respondents to these dilemmas are not a random sample
from the general population: most likely participants in these
studies are more curious, more patient and younger than the
population average. Furthermore, questionnaire studies, where
self-report measures are used, can suffer from a variety of demand
characteristics and positive response biases. Notwithstanding,
we took all the precautionary measures to minimize this by
underlining the anonymity of the questionnaire and by telling the
participants that, we are not screening individuals or interested in
clinical profiling.
Our findings imply that there is some general cognitive
structure behind responses to moral dilemmas, and none of
our analyses technically supported the exclusion of any of the
12 dilemmas used, however, there might be reasons to separate
the child sacrifice dilemmas from the other nine, or give them
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some special attention. Nevertheless, the exact nature of the
general moral cognitive structure is beyond the scope of this
paper.
CONCLUSION
In sum, we successfully showed in three studies (plus a
pilot) and in a cross validation analysis that there is a
unitary general factor of utilitarian/deontological preference that
combines all the dilemmas under the same latent construct.
We further demonstrated that the factorial loadings are
stable between studies, and suggested that the unstandardized
estimates for the factor loadings could be used as weights
for the dilemmas when averaged together in future empirical
studies.
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